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Abstract
Research in the domain of Financial Contagion has
come to the forefront in recent years. There has been a
significant focus on this field since the recession of
2008. In this paper we take a look at simulation based
modelling to stress test the stability of inter-bank loan
networks of different structures. We look to analyze the
effect of various parameters on the stability of these
networks. We first simulate networks which are
Homogeneous in nature. We then simulate a
Heterogeneous (tiered) network. The model also
introduces an endogenous loaning mechanism to
imitate a more realistic inter bank loan market. We run
simulations on these networks to gain a better
understanding of the propagation of losses through the
network. After studying the results of these simulations
we come up with some interesting new insights about
how parameters like connectivity and size of the
network, effect a tiered intra-bank financial network.
One of our key findings is that higher inter-tier
connectivity is good for the stability of big banks but
not so much for banks of smaller size.

1. Introduction
The recent global recession of 2008 was a global
disaster. It led to losses in the home equity network
that transpired to huge losses being incurred in the
stock network. According to Business Insider, the
United States of America lost more than 10 Trillion
dollars in the crash [19]. According to The Guardian,
the crash in network also led to more than 500 banks
declaring bankruptcy and a considerably higher
number of banks suffered considerable losses, in the
subsequent years [20]. Modern day financial
institutions are interlinked between each other. The
failure of one institution affects the financial health of
others. This is depicted by common “Too Big to Fail”
phrase [21] which indicates there are certain big
financial institutions that can’t be allowed to fail. The
failure of these banks will lead to catastrophic failure
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of the overall financial systems. However, though there
is an agreement that there are few banks that are too
large and too risky to fail, there has not been much
research or study on how big is too big. There is scant
understanding of the impact of various characteristics
of financial networks that may affect the stability of the
network. In light of this tragedy, the study of systemic
risk in financial Networks has come to the forefront of
research. Acemoglu et al [3] have studied this aspect
through an analytical way. They have mathematically
modeled the financial network and have identified
several properties and characteristics for stability of the
financial network.
Though mathematical modeling is important for
deriving theoretical insights, it is limited by the
assumptions that are needed to make a mathematical
model fit to a real life scenario. To address more
realistic situation, in this paper we use simulation
based network modeling to identify scenarios where
failure of one or few banks can lead to failure of the
overall system. Through simulation based approach we
determine, how Failure of one individual bank in a
financial network can cause a cascade of failures
throughout the system. We take a network model
approach [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] to do this simulation. In this
research we focus on the financial sector, specifically
interbank loan networks.
First we simulate the interbank loan network through a
simulation of a network of nodes. Next, to do stress
test of the network, we simulate shocks which can
assess the stability of the network based on certain
parameters. A concept known as contagion is
introduced which affects the whole network of nodes,
instead of just one bank. The banks have dependencies
on the other banks when they either borrow money or
lend money to other banks. Such cases are also handled
in this model of banking. Let us consider an example
of a bank which goes bankrupt and crossed the limits
of capital. The loans it has got have exceeded the limits
and it cannot repay the loan amount now. In such
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cases, the lending banks would be losing the money
and their net capital (assets) should be updated
accordingly. If a bank’s asset becomes lower than its
liabilities, we say it has defaulted and remove it from
the network. However, removal of one bank from the
financial system leads to loss of the loan given to the
removed bank by all other banks in the system. This
leads to propagation of financial loss through the
network and may lead to failure (or removal) of more
banks from the system. As the number of banks failing
due to such a domino effect increases, more unstable
the financial network becomes.
In this research we investigate the stability of this
interbank loan network against certain parameters –
number of banks, their internal connectivity and the
severity of a shock. We measure the stability by the
metric of how many nodes and how much residual
capital survives in the aftermath of the shock. We also
analyze a tiered banking network structure with an
endogenous loaning mechanism, where the decision of
granting an interbank loan is not random but is based
on risk and return of the loan.
This research is fundamental to the kind of research
being sought after by Central Banks around the world
[11][12]. At the junction of financial crisis, the output
of this research can be used by central banks to
determine when and how to intervene. For example,
whether the central bank should let a bank fail or
should it intervene – this question has wide political
and economic implications. However, seldom that
decision is driven by evidence based research. This
research aims to close that particular gap.
Some of the specific contributions of this paper are to
run simulations on tiered networks resembling the real
world inter bank loan markets and see how
connectivity and size of the network along with the
intensity of the shocking mechanism effect the stability
of such a tiered structure. We analyze in detail the
effect of such parameters on each individual tier of the
said banking network.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows in section
2 we discuss the Related Works to this kind of
research. In section 3 we describe in detail the model
and define the key terminologies that have been used in
the paper. Here we also describe the various methods
used in the model like the shocking mechanism, the
endogenous loaning mechanism and how losses
propagate in the system. In section 4, we discuss about
the metrics used and analyze the results achieved after
running simulations. This is followed by Conclusions.

2. Related Work

The way we look at the problem is very similar to the
way a disease spreads through a population where the
infection can be transmitted from one person to another
upon contact [13] [14]. This is where the name
contagion is derived from. This approach of
determining the stability of a network or propagation
of a shock has been studied in various other disciplines
like Biology [13] [14], Economics [15] [17],
Psychology [16] and Sociology [18] among many
others.
Even though the interest in contagion has seen
significant spike in recent years due to the global crisis,
it is not a new topic, Diamond and Dybvig [22] came
up with a model for bank runs and related financial
crises way back in 1983. There was also considerable
research done in the field after the Mexican Peso crisis
of 1994 and the Asian Network crash of 1997 [23][24].
However the domain really came to the forefront with
the influential paper by Allen and Gale [17] where they
analyzed the fragility of a given network system based
on its structure by making use of simple examples.
There has been a lot of theoretical research done in the
study of contagion [3] [4] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10], but there
is a lack of empirical research of the field. This lack of
empirical research has been a problem for central
banks and regulators. Many central banks around the
world have conducted research that looks to address
this issue [11] [12] [8]. However as the data required
for this kind of research is proprietary in nature,
research outside of institutions with available data,
need to resort to simulations. This has led to the use of
simulations to study the effect stability of network of
financial institutions in case of instability of one or few
banks in the network.
Nier et al [5] were one of the first to use simulation
methods to analyze the interbank loan networks. This
work, in turn, has greatly inspired a lot of further
research in this domain. The use of Eboli model which
equates the default dynamics of the interbank loan
networks to flow networks in physics, led to this work
being emulated and improved on further by multiple
papers. One such paper being Dasgupta et al [1] who
use simulations to come up with a contagion index
combining various characteristics of similar network
models as of [5]. Upper [2] in 2011 used simulations to
validate the results and compare the various models
used by different papers; this paper showcases how
simulations can be used to visualize the loan networks
as networks or graphs and how it can be a powerful
tool for analyzing interbank loan networks.
However, most of these simulations have been run on
Homogeneous networks, networks where all nodes and
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edges are of equal importance/strength. There has been
few studies with a two tiered network structure [1] [2]
[5] [6] [7] [9], where nodes are identical to nodes in its
own tier but differ from nodes of the other layer. Also
the edge weights vary leading to this structure being
very different from the Homogeneous one. Many have
argued that even though the results achieved in a
homogeneous network may work in an ideal world, the
complexity of the real world problems can be
represented by adding Heterogeneity to the said
networks. So, [1] and [5] delve into heterogeneity by
running simulations on a two tiered alpha-beta
heterogeneous network, [7] investigates the existence
of dense cores in a heterogeneous network of banks. In
this paper we extend this work by running simulations
on a three tiered structure, with heterogeneity among
nodes in each layer. We emulate a real work bank
lending network by introducing a third tier which shall
resemble the sector specific financial institutions (such
as mutual fund or other financial derivatives of various
sectors). Here the tier 1 bank is the ‘Big’ banks, so they
will have a considerably large amount of assets
whereas second tier banks will be relatively smaller in
size. The tier 3 will refer to sectors and they represent a
collection of loanees pertaining to specific domains. So
for example Real Estate can be regarded as a sector.
None of the banks will be identical to each other. We
first validate the results achieved for Homogeneous
structures and compare them to results obtained by [1]
[2] and [5]. We then show that similar relationships
can be observed for a more complex three tiered
structure as well and derive few more useful insights.

3. Model and Method
In this section we describe the model and the approach
in simulating the interbank loan networks. We
represent each entity in the interbank loan networks
(such as a bank) as a node in a directed graph. So G =
(V, E) is the network representation of interbank loan
network. V is the set of all nodes in the network, where
each node represents a financial institution (banks) that
takes part in the interbank loan. An edge
is a directional
edge from to represents a loan given by node
to node . Each node has one important characteristic,
weight (called node weight) which represents the cash
in hand with that node (financial institution). Each
edge has also a weight, which represent the current
loan amount from node to .
To model the interbank loan network we first assume
the interbank loan networks as a network of nodes and
edges. We allocate node weights to all the nodes and
edge weights to all the edges, once that is done we sum

up all the node weights to get the total net capital of the
network and denote it by N. Similarly we sum up all
the edge weights to get the total lending or borrowing
in the network and denote it by E. The ratio of these
two play an important role as we will see later and we
denote it as the N/E ratio.
Before describing the details of the loan network,
below we first describe few concepts.
Systematic Risk: Systemic risk led to financial crisis in
2008. It is a problem in banking, where an isolated
event triggers instability or collapse of the whole
system. In a banking network, due to a lot of
dependencies, if one of the banks fail, there may be a
chance of cascading failure, so losses can propagate to
all the other banks in the chain. Systemic risk is a
major concern for central banks, in safeguarding the
whole financial stability. It occurs, if some of the banks
in the network have high potential to fail and indirectly
impose the same onto the whole economy. We check
for systemic risk in our simulated network by
providing shock to the system and removing banks
which default.
Each node in the simulated interbank loan financial
network is a bank or financial entity that can borrow or
lend money in the lending network. Below we define
some common financial terminologies that are used to
denote the health of a bank. These characteristics will
be associated with each node in our model and will be
used to determine the health of the node.
Balance sheets, Assets, Liabilities, Capital: Balance
sheet is a report which shows the bank’s assets,
liabilities and the equity share of all the owners [25].
An asset has a value which can be converted to cash by
selling those [25].
Liability is an obligation that must eventually be paid
as it is a claim on assets [25]. The owner’s equity in a
bank is often referred to as bank capital [25]. We can
quote these as an equation [25],
Assets = Liabilities + Capital
Shock: Now in this model similar to [1] [5] we
introduce an external shocking mechanism. This
mechanism has two important characteristics. First,
across how many banks, such shock is introduced and
second, if a bank is effected how much of its capital
does it lose. The second parameter can be regarded as
the severity of the shock, denoted by φ, whereas the
first feature is deemed as the reach of the shock,
denoted by χ. If a bank is hit by a shock, we calculate
its remaining capital by the following equation:
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Remaining capital = (1- φ)*(Assets)
The remaining capital definition comes in handy to
ascertain when a bank fails in our model. Given an
external shock or a hit we will deem a bank to be
bankrupt or fail when its remaining capital becomes
less than its liabilities. Once a bank fails, we remove it
from the network, and the loans given to that failed
bank from other banks are deducted from their
respective assets. So this causes them to lose money
and thus the initial shock causes losses to propagate
throughout the entire network. This continues
iteratively till there is no more bank in the system
whose remaining capital is less than its liabilities.
The interbank loan network can follow two different
structures which we are going to discuss next.

Homogeneous Inter Bank Loan Network
In this kind of network each node (bank) is identical to
all the other nodes in the system and each edge is
identical to all the other edges in the Network. So, all
the node weights will be equal to each other and all
edge weights will be equal to each other. These types
of networks represent those scenarios where all
commodities in the system are equal to each other, they
are assumed to be of the nature of Erdos Renyi graphs
[1]. Though the homogenous assumption is not
realistic, due to reduced complexities most existing
research [1] [5] [7] on interbank loan network assumes
homogeneous network. Such assumptions make the
model analytically trackable. To make our research
continuation from the past research, we first study the
simulation based analysis on homogenous network to
establish the results based on existing research.
In this structure all banks will have the same net
capital, so if the total net capital of the network is
denoted as N and there are n banks, each bank thus,
will have a capital of
. Similarly if the total value
of the loan network (the amount that has been given
loan by one bank to another bank) is given as E and
there are m interbank loans (i.e. edges), each edge in
the homogeneous network will have an edge weight of
.
In our simulation of homogenous interbank loan
network, a χ fraction of banks will be hit by a shock,
where each of the banks will lose ϕ fraction of their
assets. If the remaining capital of any bank is less than
its liabilities, we will deem it to be bankrupt. After the
initial shock we will see how many of the banks
default and we will observe how much loss they
propagate to banks who had lent them money. So this
phenomenon takes in the form of a contagion and we
observe how losses propagate throughout the network

causing knock-on defaults. The number of surviving
nodes after the network has stabilized is deemed to be
the stability factor, and this is what we analyze as a
measure while running our simulations. We will
discuss the results in the next section. Next, we
introduce more complex Heterogeneous interbank loan
networks.

Heterogeneous Inter Bank Loan Network
To model the more realistic situation where both banks
and loans are of varied size, we resort to heterogeneous
network. Here, each edge and node in the network has
individual values, which are unequal. As such
heterogeneous networks are difficult to track
analytically, existing research in this domain has not
dealt with this kind of network in great detail. Even in
existing research, where heterogeneous networks have
been discussed [1][5], they assume α-β heterogeneity.
α-β heterogeneity refers to the structure where α
fraction of banks have β fraction of the assets,
generally for more heterogeneity α is close to 0, like
0.05 and β is closer to 1, say 0.9. In this research we
will not make any such assumptions about the loan
network. Here, with the help of simulation we plan to
analyze the stability of an endogenous heterogeneous
interbank loan network – which is the key contribution
of this paper.
In our model we will not have the α-β heterogeneity.
We will simply allocate Tier1 banks to be big banks
with a very high amount of assets (e.g. JP Morgan
Chase) and similarly the Tier 2 banks (e.g. any
community bank) to have a considerably lower amount
of assets. Tier 1 and tier 2 banks invest money in the
third tier which are the various sector specific financial
institutions to make money, as depicted by the figure
below. We allow tier 2 banks to take loans from tier 1
banks so that they can have more capital to invest in
the network sectors. Unlike in homogeneous structure,
here we have a rate of return associated with each loan.
For each dollar a tier 1 bank loans to a tier 2 bank, it
has to return r dollars, where r > 1, the exact value of r
varies from loan to loan (i.e. for different edges).
Similarly the loan to a sector has a rate of return R
which vary from loan to loan, but we always have R >
r > 1, for all R and r. Also there is a time paradigm in
our model, it is built in a way that each loan from tier 1
to tier 2 needs to be repaid in 2 time stamps, whereas
each loan to tier 3 gets repaid within the next time
stamp itself. This is done so that the lower level banks
can maximize each loan. Also, there is a risk of failure
associated with investing in a sector. Typically as the
rate of return of loan in a sector increases the risk of
failure of returning on the loan increases too.
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These loans and investments are not done randomly
but there is an endogenous decision making involved.
Suppose a tier 1 bank does not wish to invest in a
certain sector due to past losses, then it will not loan to
tier 2 banks which invest money in that particular
sector. Also a tier 2 bank which is financially sound
will seek to invest in sectors which have a lower risk of
failure, whereas a bank which is struggling financially,
may choose to take greater risks to make sure they do
not go under and is able to repay all the money it has
borrowed. So each loan granted or each investment
made during the simulations is not completely random
in nature but follows these realistic constraints.

In this section we describe the results obtained by our
simulated experiments.

Metrics Used
To describe the current condition of the system, we
focus primarily on two metrics.
Number of surviving nodes: This is the metric which
has been chosen repeatedly in the past as well [1] [2]
[5]. The objective of this study is to analyze the
stability of the network. It is a good measure to see
how many of the initial nodes, survived the contagion.
We reported this result for both the homogenous and
heterogeneous networks.
Percentage of money left in the system: In
heterogeneous network where the asset of each bank is
not equal, this is an important metric. For example, if
30 out of 100 banks survive the contagion, but in total
they have only 30 dollars left as asset – that’s not a
good indication of the stability of the network. So we
use the percentage amount left in the system
(computed as sum of assets left over for all the
surviving nodes) compared to the total amount in the
system before the shock as a metric for stability of the
network.

Results

Figure 1 A sample 3-tiered Heterogeneous Network
In simulating heterogeneous network, we introduce the
external shock similar to homogeneous network, but
instead of hitting banks with shocks, here the sectors
are targeted. If a sector is hit by a shock, all banks who
had invested money in that particular sector, lose the
money invested. Once the initial shock is setup we
iteratively check if any of the banks default or not, if so
how many of the banks go bankrupt and then analyze
how much losses they propagate to banks who had lent
these money.
In our heterogeneous network simulations, we observe
the number of surviving nodes in each tier along with
the total amount of money left in the system. We do
this because we believe the amount of the money left
in the network is a better representative of the state of
the network. So we run our simulations to check both
the number of surviving nodes as well the leftover
amount of money to analyze our results.

4. Results and Discussions

The simulations we run, generate plots which help us
interpret how each parameter affects the stability of the
network. Each simulation run, we do, will vary a
selected parameter, over a range of values as given in
Table 1 and Table 2, while keeping all others constant
at the benchmark values. The values that have been
chosen as parameter ranges are based on past research
done in this domain. They are inspired from the work
done by Dasgupta et al. [1], Nier et al.[5] and
Upper[2]. For each result we run a 100 simulations and
then average our findings. These experiments will help
us to understand how the parameters being examined
influences the stability of the network and whether or
not should be a factor to be monitored while
investigating systemic risk.
Another interesting aspect is the ratio of the total asset
with the total money being loaned/borrowed in the
network. This is denoted by N/E ratio and is computed
as sum of the node weights to the sum of the edge
weights. We observe the effect of N/E ratio across all
the simulations we run. For each of these parameters
that we are examining we plot multiple times with
different values of the N/E ratio.

Homogeneous Network
Here in each experiment we introduce shock with χ
reach and φ severity. We observe how that translates
into banks getting bankrupt either with directly being
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shocked or indirectly through losses propagating from
bankrupt banks in the network. This continues until the
network becomes stable, that is there are no more
Conclusion 1: Higher connectivity in the network in
banks going bankrupt. The number of surviving banks
an interbank loan network, increases the stability of
after the network stabilizes is what we are measuring to
the network. Thus banks should loan to multiple other
denote the stability of the network.
banks to increase their stability.
Effect of Connectivity: In this experiment we look at
Also the effect of N/E ratio is also quite clear. With a
the effect of connectivity over the stability of the
high N/E ratio, the network is more stable even at low
network. So here we vary the probability of forming a
values of connectivity.
link (i.e. a bank has provided loan to another bank in
the network) between two nodes from 0.05 to 0.95,
Conclusion 2: Banks should keep higher N/E ratio.
while keeping all other parameters at the benchmark
Thus the banks should be careful about how much
value.
money they lend compared to the total assets they
In Figure 2, we plot the number of solvent banks
have.
(nodes) as the edge probability increases. From Figure
The first conclusion encourages the diversification,
2, we see that with increased connectivity, number of
which is quite well known in financial market. The
surviving nodes after the shock stabilizes increases,
second asks the bank to increase the reserve they have.
making the network more stable. This result
After the 2008 financial crisis the banks have increased
demonstrates that for a network, higher connectivity is
their reserve [26]. The above conclusion and simulated
better. Banks, the more they are connected with other
demonstration support that action.
banks, tend to be more stable as any loss coming in is
shared by a number of banks and helps in reducing the
effect of the shock.
Table 1: Simulation Parameters for Homogeneous Network
Name of the
parameter(Variable)
Node total

Description

Values / Range

Total assets in the network

400M, 800M, 1200M

Edge total
Node weight
Edge weight

Total amount of loans in the network
Asset of individual bank
Amount of the total loan from one bank (origin node)
to another bank (destination node)
The ratio of the Node total to the Edge total.
Number of banks/financial institutions

800M
(10M, 40M)
(1M, 15M)
0.5, 1.0, 1.5
[10, 100]

1.0
30

Probability of forming a directed link between any two
nodes (i.e. probability that a loan exists from one bank
to another bank)
Severity of the shock
(percentage of a bank’s asset wiped out by the shock)

[0.05, 0.95]

0.5

[0.05, 0.95]

0.95

Reach of the shock (% of banks affected by shock)

[0.5, 1]

N/E ratio
Number of nodes
Connectivity of the
network
Φ

Χ

Benchmark
value

Value
Distribution

Uniform
Uniform

Uniform
increments of 5
Uniform
increments of
0.05
Uniform
increments of
0.05
Uniform

Table 2: Simulation Parameters for Heterogeneous Network
Name of the
parameter(Variable)
n1
n2
n3
Asset Range1
Asset Range2
Loan Range 1
Loan Range2
Χ

Description

Values / Range

Benchmark

Number of banks in tier1
Number of banks in tier2
Number of nodes in tier 3
Range of Assets of Tier 1
Range of Assets of Tier 2
Range of total loans from
tier1 to tier 2
Range of total loans from
tier 2 to sectors
Fraction of sectors
shocked

8, 30, 50
10, 50, 80
4, 6, 15
[10000, 14000]
[1000 , 8000]
[10000, 13000]

30
50
6
Uniform
Uniform
Uniform

[6000, 8000]
(0.05,0.95)

Distribution

Uniform
0.5

Increments of 0.05
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Inter-Tier connectivity
Rate of return
Risk of failure

Number of Tier 2 banks a
T1 bank is connected to
Return for each dollar you
invest in a sector
This is the probability, that
a sector will fail and the
money invested in it will
be lost

5, 25, 50

6

(1.05 → 2.0)

Uniform

(0.05 → 0.8)

Uniform (higher rate of
return is associated with
higher risk of failure)

Figure 2: Effect of Network Connectivity in homogenous network

Figure 3: Effect of Number of banks in Homogenous
network

Figure 4: Effect of severity of shock in Homogeneous network
In Figure 3, we look at the effect that number of banks
has on its stability. Here we see that with increased size
(i.e. increased number of banks in the network), the
financial loan market network becomes more stable.

We also observe that with higher N/E ratio more nodes
survive the shock thus making the network more
stable, this supports conclusion 2 above.
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Conclusion 3: More banks should be created and
made part of the overall loan network. With increased
number of financial institutions the stability of the
overall network increases as depicted by the higher
number percentage of surviving nodes after the shock.
In Figure 4, we investigate the stability of the network
as the severity of shock is increased. Figure 4 plots
percentage of surviving nodes as the severity of the
shock increases. We observe though at low severity of
shock the stability of the network remains (i.e.
percentage of surviving node) same, at higher severity
the stability of the network decreases drastically. We
also note that as the N/E ratio increases, the decrement
in the percentage of surviving node starts at much
higher severity of shock, indicating higher stability of
the network with higher N/E value.

Conclusion 4: Higher severity of shock leads to much
severe damage to banking network.
The simulation on homogenous network led us to
known facts – which validated our approach. Next, we
describe the simulation of heterogeneous network
which revealed some interesting new insights.

Heterogeneous Networks
In heterogeneous network simulations, we determine
the stability of the network at various severity of the
shock as the size of the network is varied and as the
connectivity of the network is varied.
Each node in the heterogeneous network has different
asset amount. The loan amount between various banks
is also different. So in heterogeneous network we use
the residual value of the total capital (as percentage of
the initial total capital in the network) as the metric for
network stability in heterogeneous network.

Figure 5: Effect of connectivity in a Heterogeneous Network
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Figure 6: Effect of Size in a Heterogeneous Network
In Figure 5, we plot the residual capital as the severity
of the shock is varied. We plot this for three different
values of inter-tier connectivity (how many Tier 2
banks are connected to one Tier 1 bank) – 5, 25 and 50.
In general for all the graphs as the severity of the shock
increases the residual capital decreases too – which is
expected. It is to be noted that at low connectivity
(Inter-tier connectivity = 5), as the severity of shock
increases the decrement in residual capital for Tier 1
bank is drastic (from 77% to 38%). At low
connectivity, if Tier 2 banks fails, due to low
connectivity between Tier 1 and Tier 2, the failure is
easily propagated to Tier 1 banks and Tier 1 banks get
affected.
However, as the connectivity increases (Inter-tier
connectivity = 50), with the increase in severity of
shock, the decrement in residual capital for Tier 1 bank
is little (79% to 70%), whereas the decrement in
residual capital for Tier 2 bank is drastic from 20% to
4%. As the Tier 1 bank holds the majority of the
capital in the market, the higher inter-tier connectivity
reduces the overall reduction of capital due to shock.
Thus for more stability of the system higher inter-tier
connectivity between tier 1 and tier 2 is preferred. With
higher inter-tier connectivity Tier 1 banks loan to
multiple small Tier 2 banks. So if few of the Tier 2
banks fail due to wrong investment in Tier 3 sectors,
the impact on Tier 1 will be much less.

Conclusion 5: Higher inter-tier connectivity leads to
better stability at Tier 1 (big) banks but lower stability
at the Tier 2 (small) banks.
Based on conclusion 5, the central authority should
encourage big banks to lend to multiple small banks
(not few selective small banks) to increase the stability
of the financial loan market.
In Figure 6 we look at the effect of size of the network
on its stability in heterogeneous network. We combine
different pairs of values for the Tier 1 and Tier 2 banks
to get the effect of size of the network to its stability.
The different combination of values chosen as (Tier 1,
Tier 2) are [Small = (8, 10), Medium = (30, 50), Large
= (50, 80)]. As can be seen from Figure 6, in case of
small network size, the remaining capital decreases
drastically from 90% to 50% in case of Tier 1 and 65%
to 8% in case of Tier 2, as the severity of shock is
increased from 0 to 0.95. With the increased size
(medium and large network), the remaining capital
decreases, but not that dramatically for both Tier 1 and
Tier 2. Also, to note that the reduction of capital
remaining with the increase of severity of shock in case
of medium and large network are very similar. This
indicates that the benefit of increased network size in
the stability of the network is limited up to certain size
of the network. After which the benefit saturates.
Conclusion 6: Increasing the size of the network in
both Tier 1 and Tier 2, in case of heterogeneous
network increases the stability of the network.
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However the increase is not linear. The benefit of
increased size saturates.
Based on conclusion 6, the central banks should
encourage higher number of both big banks and small
banks in the system than very few “too big to fail”
banks to increase the stability of the financial loan
market.

5. Conclusions
In this paper we discussed how different parameters of
the network effect the stability of network with
different structures. The paper first analyzes and shows
the effect of certain parameters on a Homogeneous
network which give us some results which are of more
intuitive nature. Then we introduce a tiered network
with endogenous loaning mechanism, where we get
few interesting results. (1) How increasing the size and
connectivity of the tiered network brings more stability
to the upper tier, whereas being not so beneficial to the
lower one, in this setting, is one of the major
contributions of this work. (2) Also seeing that size of
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